Kony at his weakest but will UPDF defeat him?

                                                              

 

                         LRA rebels at their base in Garamba National Park, north-eastern DR Congo.

As hope for a peace deal between the government and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels fades, all signs of a resumption of war are on the horizon.

Members of the LRA peace delegation who constituted the LRA's political wing, LRM, have now gone underground.

The International Criminal Court (ICC), which has issued warrants for the arrest of Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, has resumed investigations into what it calls "new war crimes".

The rebel group that has showed its face over the course of the last two years is now attempting to rebuild its mystical and ragtag image. Kony is not in contact with either his chief negotiator Dr Alfred Obita or the chief mediator, South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar.

Former Mozambique president and now UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Joachim Chissano, flew to Juba last week but his salvage efforts are unlikely to be enough to put the peace process back on course.

For now, it seems the guns will do the talking. In fact, in the last two weeks, both protagonists have clearly indicated their change of direction, with President Yoweri Museveni, by his own admission not a disciple of peace, pronouncing during his State of the Nation Address on June 5 that he will "destroy Kony If he attempts to come to Uganda".

Within two hours of the president's speech, the LRA staged an attack, not on Uganda, but on its ally and peace mediator the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The attack on a detachment in Nabanga left 22 dead, including a major.

Kony immediately called Radio France International (RFI), crying foul. He said his soldiers had been attacked by SPLA and they fought back. He maintained, however, that he was still interested in talking peace and introduced his new spokesperson, Maj. Justine Okello.

For the people of northern Uganda, who were only beginning to return to their homes after 20 years in camps, this is the most dampening news. It means the 22-month lull that has seen the end of fighting, abductions, rapes and killings of civilians is over.

The question now is: how did the "most credible peace process" get off track and who is responsible? It is difficult to point a finger to any one direction, but some Acholi in the diaspora have been cited, as has the Islamist government in Khartoum.

But if war is on the agenda of the LRA, then the Khartoum regime, which was the rebels main logistics supplier, may have changed gear and once again want to use the rebels in a dirty war. Indeed,

The Independent has received reports, corroborated in several intelligence circles, that LRA's majorally Khartoum has maintained links with indicted warlord Kony and that those links have grown stronger, especially as Sudan's Islamic north finds itself in a state of war.

Which way for northern Uganda?

A May report by US-based organization enough is instructive and could illustrate the scenario ahead. "The LRA will continue to terrorize the region until Kony comes out of the bush of his own volition, by force of arrest, or military defeat.

With a new and largely impenetrable base in the Central African Republic, Kony and his forces pose an immediate threat to neighboring southern Sudan, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and southeastern Central African Republic," the report said, also noting that,

"Northern Uganda is the most difficult of Kony's potential targets; it is far from his current operational base and better defended than other targets in the sub-region. It could, therefore, be spared from any attacks in the short term".

However, the report continues, civilians in neighboring countries are vulnerable, and "if the LRA is not neutralized well in advance of the 2009 elections in Sudan, there is a real danger that the Sudanese government will, as it has done in the past, use the LRA as a proxy force to destabilize parts of southern Sudan in the run-up to the polls".

When Kony first moved his troops to Central African Republic in March, a telephone link between him and Mahamat Nouri, Chad's insurgent leader was tracked.

Nouri, who currently commands the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), is backed by Khartoum. The Chadian rebels have been able to exploit volatility in neighbouring Sudan, establishing rear bases in Sudan's troubled Darfur region.

"There is reason to believe that Khartoum wanted Kony to reinforce Nouri's weak forces at the time they attempted to attack Chad," says a UN security official based in Southern Sudan.

The Independent has learned from intelligence sources that in early October 2007, a Sudanese intelligence official identified as Capt. Fadil Habib held a meeting with an LRA contact in Nairobi, one Opoka Latigo.

The details of the meeting remain unknown. More recently, in the first week of June this year, SPLA intelligence speaks of reports that a Sudan Airforce (SAF) helicopter flew into northeast DR Congo in the last week of May to supposedly pick up Kony. It later flew north to Weret, in central-western Sudan.

There has, however, been no independent confirmation of that information.

In the past four months, Khartoum has been in a state of siege following an attack by Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Rebels on the Khartoum suburb of Omdurman in May and the resumption of hostilities with troops of the semi-autonomous government in South Sudan at oil rich Abyei. Other information obtained by The Independent indicates Khartoum had wanted LRA to relocate to areas near Abyei and Darfur late in 2007.

The information further suggests that former LRA second-in-command Vincent Otti's refusal to relocate to those areas is partly responsible for his execution in October the same year.

So is the rebel force in a strong enough position to cause mayhem as it has done over the years?

 

The status of the LRA

The rebel group that has stuck out for more than 20 years is now at its worst strength yet. Documents obtained by The Independent indicate that Kony has only 1,050 people remaining.

These include: "Total force 600-700 armed fighters, 200-300 dependents (women and children) and 200-300 new abductees," according to an intelligence briefing released in June. In addition to those low numbers, the rebels seem to be doing worse in arms.

"Main weapons 550-650 SMGs, 11 PKs and 5 RPGs," the briefing compiled from several LRA escapees said. Over the two years of peace talks, Kony also greatly altered the structure of the rebel group.

Traditionally, the LRA was organized in a regular infantry army formation with five brigades: Control Altar (Kony's protection unit), Stockree, Sinia, Gilva and Shila.

However, recent information reveals a drastically different LRA. Kony has scrapped four brigades, only retaining his, Control Altar. He also divided the rest of LRA into five brigades, two of which he named Happo Brigade and are led by Alphonso Lamola and Central Brigade.

The two brigades are set up in such a way that they back up security for Control Altar, Kony's protections unit. This shows that Kony is taking his personal security more seriously than ever.

The other unnamed three brigades are meant for combat activities and are led by Divisional Commander Brig. Bok Abudema. The three brigades include the First Brigade led by "Lt. Col. Okot Odek, the 2nd Brigade led by Lt Col Acaye Doctor Francis and the 3rd Bridage led by CO Maj. Odong Murefu," according to the brief.

The document further details LRA commanders who have, since the murder of Kony's second in command Vincent Otti, been demoted. They include: former Intelligence Chief Maj. Gen. Caesar Acelam, Col. Kwoyelo Latoni, and Kony's long serving signaler, Capt. Labalpiny. Currently, the LRA is cut off from its several arms caches in western and eastern Equatoria Province of South Sudan.

It has built its six new bases in north-eastern DR Congo, but all within 50-70 km of the DR Congo-Sudan border and spread towards Central Africa Republic.

The bases include the LRA headquarters in Garamba forest; other bases are: one north of Duru, two south of Bitima, one south of Lamola and another one south of Doruma, all in northeastern DRC.

What next?

Though Kampala is itching to launch a military onslaught on the LRA in the DR Congo, it cannot. Its persistent requests to the DRC to enter a joint anti-LRA military alliance have beenflatly rejected.

Kinshasa, which is also embroiled in a border dispute with Uganda, according to diplomatic sources, still asks Kampala to first pay the fine of $10 billion awarded by the International Court of Justice in 2005 for the alleged plunder of its natural resources by top commanders of the UPDF between 1998 and 2003.

"Since Kony is in Congo, it is the responsibility of President Kabila and the UN to deal with him. If Congo asked for our assistance to go and deal with Kony there, we are ready, able and prepared to go.

If Kony tried to come to Uganda we shall destroy him as quickly as we did in Teso in 2003," Museveni said during his State of the Nation Address. In a recent communiqué by joint army chiefs from Uganda, South Sudan and DR Congo,

It was agreed instead that the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) would lead the fight against LRA with the help of the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC.

However, the vast central-African country still has its own problems, and they are colossal. Not only is it still struggling with its internal civil strife, its army has no presence in the country's northeast and is weak and ill-armed.

It is not yet clear how the MONUCFARDC offensive will be rolled out. The UN, which is still nursing its wounds from LRA attacks made way back in February 2006, is likely to play a minimal logistical and air support role.

But if history can judge both FARDC and MONUC from their past operations against forces of dissident Gen. Laurent Nkunda late last year, there might be some problems.

 Within five days of a joint FARDC-MONUC offensive in December 2007, thousands of the Congolese soldiers deserted.

Today, Nkunda still exists in eastern Congo and poses a threat to Kinshasa. Kony may still hold out for a while, only limited in how much destruction he can do.

--
Jean-Louis Kayitenkore
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